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Abstract:
We  study  the  nature  of  career  concerns  of  regional  leaders  in  Soviet  Russia  under 
Khrushchev  and  Brezhnev.  We  document  a  substantial  over-time  variation  in  career 
concerns  associated  with  reforms of  Soviet  governing  hierarchy.  We  demonstrate  that 
Khrushchev’s  “Sovnarkhoz”  system—a  unique  episode  in  Soviet  history,  when  a 
traditional Soviet unitary-form (U-form) hierarchy was replaced by a multidivisional-form 
(M-form)  organization—created  yardstick  competition  in  industrial  performance  of 
regional  leaders.  High-powered  career  incentives,  however,  did  not  result  in  faster 
industrial growth on average. We find that only two groups of regional leaders performed 
better in response to increased incentives. 1) Leaders appointed during “Sovnarkhoz” were 
able to learn new rules better. 2) Leaders with good connections to their neighbors were 
able to overcome negative inter-regional externalities, a common byproduct of M-form. 
The lack of success of the “Sovnarkhoz” system triggered the separation of regional units 
along production branch lines, which, as we show, led to a substantial decrease of industrial 
growth rates. The failure of Khrushchev's management reforms together with the  U-form 
lobby contributed  to  his  dismissal  and  reinstatement  of  the  U-form  hierarchy  under 
Brezhnev.
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1. Introduction
Career concerns are an important determinant of performance and stability of any political 
hierarchy. They, in turn, depend on the organizational form of the hierarchy. Starting with 
Chandler  (1962)  and  Williamson  (1975),  an  extensive  theoretical  economic  literature 
considered incentive aspects of differences between M-form (multidivisional form) and U-
form (unitary form) hierarchies. The form describes the organization of a hierarchy into 
divisions:  the  M-form  hierarchy  is  comprised  of  a  collection  of  fairly  self-contained 
territorial  divisions  implementing  the  same  tasks,  whereas  the  U-form  hierarchy  is 
organized along functional lines and consists of a number of departments implementing 
complementary tasks on the same territory. Qian and Xu (1993) and Maskin, Qian and Xu 
(2000)  argued  that  Soviet  economy  was  a  giant  U-form  hierarchy  with  political  and 
economic orders directed via highly specialized sectoral ministries, while Chinese economy 
more closely resembles an M-form as it is comprised of relatively self-sufficient provinces. 
This  economic  literature  highlighted  tradeoffs  between economies  of  scale,  on the one 
hand, (arguably)  better  utilized by the U-form hierarchy,  and power of career  concerns 
created by yardstick competition (e.g., Holmstrom 1982 and Shleifer 1985) and flexibility 
(Qian, Roland and Xu 2006), on the other hand, characteristic of the M-form. Sociologists 
and political scientists also consider differences between organizational forms and argue 
that the U-form permits central authorities to limit involvement of lower-tier managers in 
strategic decision-making and maintain stability and order within the structure via personal 
control mechanisms better than the M-form (see, for instance, Palmer et al. 1993, Freeland 
1996).
In this paper, we investigate the nature of career concerns of regional party leaders in 
Soviet  Russia,  the largest  republic  in  the USSR. In particular,  we study economic  and 
political factors that influenced career mobility under Nikita Khrushchev and early Leonid 
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Brezhnev. We show that career concerns varied substantially over time. Specifically,  we 
study the unique episode in the Soviet history when Nikita Khrushchev dismantled the U-
form  organization  of  Soviet  industry  and  reorganized  it  along  the  lines  of  M-form 
hierarchy,  namely,  the “Sovnarkhoz” reform. Using panel data on regional performance 
and careers of regional leaders in Soviet Russia, we demonstrate that the reform created 
yardstick competition in industry among regional party leaders and that such competition 
was largely absent both before the reform and after its reversal. This finding contrasts with 
the premise of previous economic literature that treats Soviet system as a classic example 
of  a  U-form hierarchy  and  ignores  substantial  over-time  variation  associated  with  the 
“Sovnarkhoz” reform. 
Did  the  high-powered  career  concerns,  present  during  the  “Sovnarkhoz”  reform, 
positively affect the countries’ industrial performance? Our analysis of the panel data on 
regional industrial growth show that career incentives during the “Sovnarkhoz” period did 
not  result  in  faster  industry  growth  on  average.  This  seemingly  puzzling  fact  sharply 
contrasts  with  the results  of  Soviet-Chinese  comparison  by  Qian  and  Xu  (1993).  We 
address this puzzle by studying the variation in regional leaders’ response to the change in 
incentives triggered by the organizational reform. We find that only two groups of regional 
leaders performed better in response to reform. First, leaders, who were appointed during 
“Sovnarkhoz” reform, were able to learn new rules better and adjust to them faster. This 
finding is consistent with the literature on the importance of the change in human capital to 
supplement  incentives  for  economic  transformation  to  take  place  (see,  for  instance, 
Barberis et al. 1996). Second, the leaders with good personal connections to their neighbors 
also exhibited higher growth performance in response to the reform. These leaders were 
better equipped to overcome negative inter-regional externalities, a common byproduct of 
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the M-form hierarchy (see, for instance, Musgrave 1969 and Oates 1972 in the context of 
federalism). 
Our findings  on the  variation  in  responses  of  regional  party  leaders  to  incentives 
highlight two potential costs of organizational reform which switches to M-form from U 
form: transaction costs, associated with the need for new human capital, and inter-regional 
externalities. We argue that Khrushchev tried to address the initial failure of the M-form to 
deliver higher growth on average when he initiated his second organizational reform in late 
1962. The undertaken modification of the “Sovnarkhoz”  system consisted of two major 
changes: 1) the enlargement of territorial divisions to cover several regions instead of a 
single region each, which was supposed to mitigate inter-regional externalities; and 2) the 
separation of regional units along production branch lines (into agricultural and industrial 
regional divisions), which was supposed to create additional positions for newcomers and 
address  the  need  for  new  human  capital.  The  second  reform,  however,  proved  to  be 
completely counter productive as it deprived Khrushchev of political support of regional 
leaders (who lost power because of the split of territorial divisions in two sub-units) and led 
to  a  sharp  decline  in industrial  growth  rates  (due  to  disorganization  created  by  this 
restructuring  of  territorial  divisions). The  failure  of  the  two consecutive  organizational 
reforms  to  deliver  growth  together  with  the  political  opposition  of  a  powerful  interest 
group,  comprised  of  ministerial  leaders  who  lost  power  in  this  reform, contributed  to 
Khrushchev’s  dismissal  and  the  reversal  to  the  U-form  traditional  hierarchy  under 
Brezhnev. Overall, the Soviet experience demonstrates the potential severe difficulties in 
overcoming costs associated with M-form hierarchy and underlines a potential  threat  to 
political stability of the system associated with organizational reforms; as they are bound to 
created powerful groups in opposition to reforms. Such potential threat to political stability 
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may have contributed to Brezhnev’s reluctance to conduct organizational reforms in order 
to mitigate inefficiencies of Soviet economy throughout his leadership. 
We also document that regional agricultural performance affected regional leaders' 
careers during the whole period under study. This finding is consistent with the fact that the 
management  of  agriculture,  in  contrast  to  industry,  in  the  Soviet  Union  was  always 
organized as an M-form. In addition,  we show that personal connections  to the central 
leadership were an important determinant of careers of regional party leaders throughout 
the  whole  period,  as  one  would  expect  from any management  structure  that  relies  on 
bureaucratic appointments.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews related literature. In section 
3, we provide stylized facts on the Soviet political hierarchy and overviews history of the 
“Sovnarkhoz” reform. In Section 4, we formulate our hypotheses. Section 5 describes the 
data. In Section 6, we present our findings. Section 7 concludes.
2. Related literature.
Our  paper  is  related  to  several  large  strands  of  economic  and  economic  history 
literatures.  First,  there  is  a  large  literature  which  studies  agency  problems  of  Soviet 
command economy. Starting with  Berliner (1957) and Granik (1959), a large number of 
authors demonstrated that the command system of Soviet economy was inefficient due to 
the lack of transparency and excessive bureaucratization. To date, there is, however, little 
careful analysis of factors that allowed the system to work for such a long period of time 
despite all the inefficiencies (Gregory 2003). 
The determinants of careers of regional party leaders and state officials in the Soviet 
Union  have  been  studied  by  Sovetologists  in  the  1960s  and  1970s  (Armstrong  1959, 
Blackwell  1972,  Blackwell  et  al.  1973,  Brzezinski  and  Huntington  1964,  Frank  1971, 
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Hodnett  1965,  Hough  1969,  McAuley  1974,  Oliver  1973,  Stewart  et  al.  1972).  The 
literature offered two theories of career advancement. According to the first theory, i.e., 
“patron-client  model”  (e.g.,  Brzezinski  and  Huntington  1964  and  Armstrong  1959), 
personal connections to the central leadership determined bureaucrats’ vertical mobility in 
the  hierarchy.  According  to  the  second  view,  i.e.,  the  so-called  “rational-technical 
explanation” (e.g., Hough 1969), the main reason for promotions was performance, i.e., the 
ability to fulfill the plan. 
Most previous studies of career concerns of Soviet regional leaders relied on case-
study  evidence.  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge  there  have  been  only  two  attempts  of 
statistical  analysis  of  determinants  of  career  advancement  of  Soviet  regional  leaders: 
Stewart et al. (1972) and Blackwell et al. (1973). Both papers used a pooled cross-section 
of selective cases of regional party leaders’ turnover in attempt to test the “patron-client” 
vs.  “rational-technical”  model.  Since econometric  techniques  used in  these studies  date 
back  to  the  pre-PC  epoch,  their  analyses  suffer  from  intractability  and  biases  from 
selection, omitted variables, and reverse causality. In contrast to these studies, we use the 
population of turnovers of Soviet regional party leaders collected from archival data and 
apply modern panel data econometrics to analyze these data.
Our paper is also closely related to the literature which links the success of China’s 
development  in  the  last  30 years  to  the  presence  of  high-powered  career  concerns  for 
promotion of Chinese provincial leaders to the higher-level positions within the Chinese 
Communist party hierarchy (Blanchard and Shleifer 2001, Qian and Xu 1993, and Maskin, 
Qian and Xu 2000). Li and Zhou (2005), Chen, Li and Zhou (2005), and Gang (2007) 
found  empirical  support  to  these  arguments  by  showing  that  the  main  criterion  of 
promotion  and  demotion  of  provincial  government  officials  in  China  have  been  the 
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provincial  growth performance relative to the average performance  and to performance 
under the predecessor. 
3. Regional leaders in Soviet Political Hierarchy: a Historical Background
3.1. Initial U-form hierarchy 
The Soviet Union, formally a federation, was in fact a very centralized state with a single 
center  of  decision-making  and  a  strict  top-down  hierarchy  of  authority.  Under 
Nomenklatura system, introduced in 1923, state officials at each level of the hierarchy were 
appointed by the higher-level officials (Levin 1997).
Since the beginning of five-year plans in 1928, Soviet industry was organized along 
production branch lines. Specialized ministries and departments managed all enterprises in 
corresponding sectors of the economy across all regions; one ministry was responsible for 
one production branch. There are at least two complementary reasons why the dictator (i.e., 
Stalin) chose such organizational form. First, it utilized better the economy of scales, on 
which Socialist industrialization of the 1930s relied heavily (Davies et al. 1994). Second, it 
ensured the dictator’s  control over resource allocation which was the key instrument of 
power in the political economy of the 1930s (Gregory 2003, Gregory and Harrison 2005). 
The top-down branch hierarchies did not allow regional elites to succeed in appropriating 
control over resource allocation (Harris 1999).
In the traditional Soviet hierarchy regional authorities played a secondary role. In the 
economy with industry paying the most important role, they were mainly responsible for 
the production of local public goods and agriculture, as there were no economies of scale in 
agriculture for technological reasons. Regional party leaders – first party secretaries – de 
facto  were  the  top  regional  executives,  despite  the  fact  that  formally  state  officials 
(governors) were the region heads. Governors were subordinated to their party bosses.
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Recent  historical  research  in  declassified  Soviet  archives  provides  new details  on 
factors influencing career mobility of regional leaders. Historical documents published in 
Denisov et  al.  (2004)  demonstrate  that  the center  carefully  monitored  regional  leaders. 
Regional party organization had to report to the center at least once a year and regularly 
present information about performance of local managers (Denisov et al. 2004 document 
#18, 26/01/1953; document #21, 05/10/46). The volume describes several cases of local 
party secretaries’ demotions after the Second World war; in several of them poor economic 
performance of regions was named by higher officials as an important reason of removals 
of regional leaders (see cases of Vladimir and Ivanovo 1947, Ryasan’ 1948, Kursk 1950, 
Kirov 1952 etc.: documents # 76-78; 82; 119-121; 127-130 in Denisov et al. 2004). These 
cases suggest that  the central  government  paid special  attention  to regional  agricultural 
performance and, especially, to the fulfillment of area-under-crops plans.
There is some historical evidence that political  connections were also important for 
regional  leaders’  careers  (Khlevnuk  2003).  For  instance,  in  the  1920s  Stalin  used  his 
position of the General Secretary of the Communist party to place his supporters to the key 
positions in the apparatus, including regional offices. Lazarev and Gregory (2004) provide 
a case-study of cars’ allocation among party elites which demonstrates that the dictator also 
used his control over distribution of resources to maintain loyalty of the supports. 
3.2. Introduction of M-form: “Sovnarkhoz” reform
Stalin’s  death  in  March  1953  triggered  a  power  struggle  among  the  closest  Stalin’s 
subordinates.  This  power  struggle  led  to  several  consecutive  reorganizations  of  the 
governing hierarchy (Ballis 1961, Swearer 1959). Table 1 overviews the main historical 
events in this power struggle and organizational reforms which were set off by it.
Table 1 somewhere here.
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In March 1953 Khrushchev was not on the top of the list of the most likely Stalin’s 
successors. The main candidate, Georgii Malenkov, inherited the post of the head of the 
Soviet government from the dictator, while Khrushchev became ‘just’ a party secretary, 
and was promoted to the first party secretary in September 1953 (the position did not exist 
before that).  During the next  four  years  Khrushchev and Malenkov were in  a  political 
battle. Malenkov, as the head of the Soviet government, had political support of the state 
apparatus, including production branch ministries. In contrast, Khrushchev, as the leader of 
the party,  relied heavily on the party’s political support, and, especially,  on the regional 
party secretaries. 
Khrushchev  acquired the support  of regional  party leaders by means of canceling 
secret police monitoring of their work and granting them more authority in local decision-
making (Khlevnuk et al. 2009). In addition, Khrushchev promoted many of his supporters 
to the key regional positions (Rigby 1984, Khelvnuk 2003). At the same time, however, 
Khrushchev publicly  proclaimed on several  occasions  that  the performance  of  regional 
officials was an important factor determining their carriers (Ballis 1961; Tomilina et al. 
2009 vol. 2, p. 233). The apparatus of the party Central Committee continued to monitor 
activities of local officials including “their ability to realize the party policy in practice” 
(Khlevnuk et al. 2009 document # 33, 23.07.1955). Special archive with records of regional 
development was established in the central party apparatus (Khlevnuk et al. 2009 document 
#  32,  30.03.1955).  Khlevnuk  et  al.  (2009)  published  recently  declassified  historical 
documents which show that in many cases in those years the dismissal of regional leaders 
was  caused  by  the  poor  performance  of  regions  under  their  control  (Bryansk  1954; 
Yaroslavl’ 1954; Karelia 1955; Vologda 1955; Sverdlovsk 1955 etc. documents # 11-12; 
13-15; 16; 17; 18).
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In January 1955, Khrushchev managed to dismiss Malenkov from the Prime Minister 
position, but Malenkov remained a member of the Presidium of the Communist party (an 
official name of Politburo under Khrushchev) (Fursenko et al. 2004, p. 35, protocol of the 
Presidium/Politburo meeting on 22.01.1955). The power struggle reached culmination in 
1957 when Khrushchev’s  initiated  a  major  organizational  reform of  the  economic  and 
political hierarchy.  In late January 1957, Khrushchev started the so-called “Sovnarkhoz” 
reform.  The essence of the reform was in abolition of the production branch industrial 
ministries  and establishment  of the regional bodies,  called “Sovnarkhozes,” i.e.,  literary 
Soviet councils of national economy, which were supposed to oversee and manage industry 
and  construction  in  the  regions  (Fursenko  et  al.  2004  p.  221-223  protocol  of  the 
Presidium/Politburo  meeting  on  28.01.1955).  Thus,  the  reform made  regional  officials 
responsible for industrial development of their regions. This meant a drastic reallocation of 
power from ministerial elite in the center to the regional elites, and, almost importantly, to 
regional  party  leaders.  Publicly,  Khrushchev  explained  the  reform by  the  necessity  to 
overcome negative elements of the ministerial system – narrow departments’ interests and 
ministerial autarky (Hoeffding 1957; Swearer 1959).
The  reform  was  implemented  very  fast.  Central  party  committee  approved  the 
“Sovnarkhoz”  initiative in February 1957 and a formal law introducing the system took 
force on May 10 of the same year. The ministerial lobby in the Presidium/Politburo tried to 
sabotage  the  reform  (Fursenko  et  al.  2004  pp.  221-223,  236-241  protocol  of  the 
Presidium/Politburo meeting on 28.01.1957, 22.03.1957; Kovaleva et al. 1998 pp. 194 - 
195). Moreover, having a majority in the Presidium/Politburo of the central committee of 
the  Communist  party,  the  ministerial  lobby attempted  to  dismiss  Khrushchev from his 
office in June 1957. In response, Khrushchev called a meeting of the Central committee, 
where  regional  secretaries  constituted  a  majority,  in  which  he  managed  to  crush  the 
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opposition  (the  so-called  “anti-party  group  of  Malenkov-Molotov-Kaganovich”).  Soon 
Khrushchev became the  undisputable  leader  of  the  country:  in  April  1958 he replaced 
Bulganin, who was discredited by his support of the ‘anti-party’ group, in the office of the 
head of the Soviet government. Khrushchev’s victory also meant that the realization of the 
“Sovnarkhoz” system was put into practice during the second half of 1957. The decree, 
September 26 1957 detailed the reorganization procedure (Swearer 1959, p. 52).
The “Sovnarkhoz” system was built through a trial-and-error process during late 1957 
– early  1958 years  (Swearer  1961).  Regional  leaders  lobbied  for  the widening of  their 
authority (Swearer 1959 p. 56). Some of them went as far as suggesting to institute fiscal 
federalism (Churchward 1977). Khrushchev rejected these initiatives. The “Sovnarkhoz” 
reform did  not  mean  decentralization  of  the  Soviet  political  hierarchy;  rather  it  meant 
reshaping  its  form  (Hoeffding  1957,  Swearer  1959,  1962a).  Nonetheless,  Khrushchev 
carefully  took  into  account  the  interests  of  regional  secretaries.  Initially,  Khrushchev 
envisioned few regional economic bodies (“Sovnarkhozes”), such that each “Sovnarkhoz” 
is responsible for several administrative regions. Regional officials, however, successfully 
lobbied  for  their  own  unshared  “Sovnarkhozes” (Swearer  1959).  As  a  result,  105 
“Sovnarkhozes” were established in the USSR, 68 of them in Russian Federation.1
Each “Sovnarkhoz” got authority over industry and construction in the region under 
its  control.  “Sovnakhozes”  had  to  prepare  a  draft  of  regional  plan  in  cooperation  with 
Gosplan – the Central State Planning Body. After the government’s approval of the plan, 
they had to fulfill them. The center allocated resources for the realization of planned tasks. 
The power and responsibilities of Gosplan under “Sovnarkhoz” system greatly increased. It 
became the primary central authority, which defended national interests (Ballis 1961 pp. 
160-163; Hoefding 1957 pp. 73-74; Swearer 1959 pp. 54-58). 
1 There were 70 regions in Russian Federation at that time. North-west Sovnarkhoz that 
included Leningrad region, Novgorod region and Pskov region was the only exception.
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The role of regional party leaders in that system enormously increased. “Sovnarkhoz” 
officials admitted their subordination to the regional party organization (Ballis 1961 p. 162; 
Swearer 1962b p. 34). Khrushchev publicly and repeatedly pointed to the responsibility of 
regional party leaders for regional economic development. He also emphasized that they 
are rewarded and punished depending on region’s performance (Swearer  1962a p.  458; 
Swearer 1962b p. 37). In 1961, term limits and a turnover rule for party secretaries were 
added to the Party’s statute (but neither was fully enforced).
3.2.1. Inter-regional externalities as a by-product of  the “Sovnarkhoz” reform  
The main drawback of the  “Sovnarkhoz”  system was ‘localism’ in the behavior of 
regional authorities, as it was described by the central officials. Regions tried to compose 
plans favorite for their local interests at the expense of national development. They illegally 
reallocated resources, which they got from the center, in favor of local projects, from which 
they benefited directly, and paid priority to intra-regional deliveries that often resulted in 
inter-regional  deliveries  failures.  Contemporary  Soviet  press  was  full  of  examples 
describing  such  behavior  which  was  heavily  criticized  (Swearer  1959 pp.  49,  51,  58). 
Recently declassified documents from the Soviet archives illustrate the magnitude of this 
phenomenon. So-called ‘non-planned’ investments – not included in the National plan and 
not authorized by the central planner – doubled after the introduction of the “Sovnarkhoz” 
system  (Khlevnuk  et  al.  2009  document  #  73,  28.11.1959).  Narrow  interests  were  a 
problem  under  Soviet  ministerial  system  as  well,  but  the  magnitude  of  the  effect  of 
negative  inter-ministerial  externalities  was  presumably  less  than  negative  inter-regional 
externalities  due to  high  level  of  vertical  integration  and autarky of  production  branch 
divisions (Gregory and Stuart 1998).
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The central authority  made an effort to mitigate the problem. A law prescribing the 
priority of inter-regional contracts appeared already in April 1958 (Swearer 1959 p. 59; 
Swearer 1 962a p. 468). In May 1958 the Presidium/Politburo of the Communist  party 
discussed  and  blamed  the  practice  of  illegal  resource  allocation  which  followed  by  a 
national campaign (Fursenko 2004, p. 309,  protocol of Politburo meeting on 06.08.1959). 
Administrative and criminal cases were opened against plan discipline violators (Swearer 
1959 p.  59;  Khlevnuk et  al.  2009 document  #  77,  15.09.1962).  Strict  restrictions  were 
introduced to regulate the use of resources and investment funds by regional authorities 
(Swearer 1962b p. 33) In 1960 and 1961 bodies, which were prescribed to coordinate inter-
regional economic development, were established: All-Russian, Ukrainian and Kazakhstan 
republican  economic  councils  and  councils  for  particular  economic  regions,  like  Urals, 
Central Asia etc. 
3.2.2. The stages of the reversal of  the ‘Sovnarkoz’ reform  
In  order  to mitigate  negative  inter-regional  externalities,  Khrushchev  initiated  the 
second stage of “Sovnarkhoz”  reform in September  1962 (Fursenko 2004 pp.  576-596; 
record of Khrushchev’s speech at the Presidium/Politburo meeting on 20.09.1962). The 
reform was realized in November-December of the same year. So-called state production 
branch  committees  were  established  in  Moscow;  they  had  to  coordinate  planning  in 
corresponding sectors of economy. The management of the construction industry, i.e. the 
control over investments funds, was moved from regional “Sovnarkhozes” to the national 
State  construction  committee.  “Sovnarkhoz” divisions  were  enlarged  to  overcome 
parochial  tendencies:  new  enlarged  “Sovnarkhozes”  typically  managed  several 
administrative regions (Mieczkowski 1965). Thus, each regional party unit, which covered 
a corresponding administrative region, covered only a part of the new “Sovnarkhoz”. In 
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practice this meant that several regional party secretaries had to supervise local economic 
activity and this created substantial disorganization.
In addition, trying to shape career incentives for party leaders, Khrushchev separated 
party units into separate industrial and agricultural party bodies in more than one half of the 
regions. Exceptions were made for autonomous national republics and regions with clearly 
pronounced agricultural specialization. Khrushchev stated that the new system would allow 
regional party secretaries to focus on a particular sector of the regional economy and help 
boosting  economic  performance  (Fursenko  2004,  pp.  576-596;  record  of  Khrushchev’s 
speech at the Presidium/Politburo meeting on 20.09.1962). 
The  separation  of  regional  party  organizations  extended  the  number  of  available 
regional  party  secretaries’  positions.  This  allowed  some  scholars  to  interpret  the  1962 
reform as Khrushchev’s attempt to replace  gradually the old regional  elites  in order  to 
promote younger and more educated officials  (Armstrong 1966).2 The majority of ‘old’ 
regional party secretaries kept their jobs during the separation reform but lost one half of 
their power.  Thus, they strongly opposed this reorganization. 
Summarizing the changes caused by the 1962 reorganization, it should be noted that it 
substantially modified the ‘pure’ ‘Sovnarkhoz’  system which existed between 1958 and 
1962. In assessment of the results of 1962 reform, historians agree that the separation of 
party units caused a chaos in management and proved to be counter-productive (Hanson 
2003). 
Many writers name the separation of the party units as one of important reasons for 
the success of the coup against Khrushchev (Pikhoya 2000; Burlazkii 2008). The reason is 
that Khrushchev lost the political support of regional leaders who were members of the 
Central  party  committee.  Importantly,  only  the  ‘old’  secretaries  were  members  of  the 
2 There are some pieces of evidence that regional party elite started to turn into a kind of 
close club, which consisted of the generation promoted by Stalin after the Great terror and 
during the 1940s (Pikhoya 2000; Khlevnuk et al. 2009).
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Central party committee in 1964; and the ‘new’ secretaries promoted in 1962 were not.3 In 
days after the dismissal  of Khrushchev, Brezhnev re-united regional party organizations 
and fully restored the powers of the ‘old’ secretaries (Armstrong 1966).
The  ministerial  lobby  in  the  center  also  played  an  important  role  in  helping  the 
Brezhnev’s  plot  against  Khrushchev.  Once Khrushchev was removed in  October  1964, 
Alexei Kosygin – an influential Soviet industrial top-manager - became the head of the 
government,  as a part  of duumvirate with Leonid Brezhnev. Brezhnev and his allies in 
Moscow apparatus stated that “Sovnarkhoz”  system undermined the power of the center 
(Fursenko 2004, pp. 862-872 protocol of the Presidium/Politburo meeting on 13.10.1964; 
Vestnik  … 2006,  p.  32-43 Record  of  Brezhnev’s  speech  at  the  meeting  of  Leningrad 
regional  party  organization  on  12.07.1965).  While  the  new  government  reintroduced 
production  branch  ministries  almost  in  a  year  after  the  coup;  Brezhnev  and his  allied 
planned this reform from the very first day in power (Tomilina 2009 p. 194; a draft of the 
Presidium/Politburo report to the Central party committee meeting on 13.10.1964). They 
arguably  postponed  the  reform to  ensure  the  support  of  regional  elites  for  the  coup’s 
success. The reintroduction of production branch ministerial system deprived regional party 
secretaries of control over industry. 
Historians agree that turnover in the Kremlin also meant a change in the personnel 
policy.  Leonid  Brezhnev  relied  heavily  on  political  loyalty  in  his  relations  with 
subordinates (Pikhoya 2000). He promoted many of his former colleagues,  e.g.,  Andrei 
Kirilenko, Nikolai Shchelokov and Vladimir Sherbitskii (Dneproterovsk clan, named at the 
city where Leonid Brezhnev was a regional party secretary in the Stalin’s time).  In the 
3 The  reform  was  planed  and  realized  between  the  22nd and  23rd  Communist  party 
congresses, occurred in 1961 and 1966 correspondingly. Only the congress formally could 
appoint the Central committee; and in 1961 future ‘new’ secretaries had too low political 
ranks to be elected into the committee.
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relations  with regional  elite  Brezhnev introduced the policy of “no-turnover  of cadres” 
which postulated no demotions except in the extraordinary circumstances (Khlevnuk 2003). 
4. Hypotheses
To formulate testable hypotheses we draw on stylized facts about career concerns of 
Soviet regional leaders before, during, and after the “Sovnarkhoz” reform. 
The “Sovnarkhoz” reform displaced the U-form organization of Soviet industry and 
instituted the M-form organization; after the reversal of the reform, U-form organization 
was reinstituted. Our aim is to study the incentive effects of such a drastic organizational 
change. We expect that the reform created yardstick competition in industry for regional 
leaders, which was not there before the reform and which was eliminated after its reversal 
in  1965.  Thus,  we  test  for  whether  the  industrial  performance  of  the  region  was  an 
important determinant of regional leaders’ career advancement in the years between 1958 
and 1964 and was not such before and after. To preview our results, we do find empirical 
support to this hypothesis.
A drastic  change in incentives  of  regional  leaders  should  have translated  into the 
change in behavior. We test for the overall outcome of the reform. In particular, we test 
whether  party  secretaries  delivered  higher  than  average  growth  rates  in  the  period  of 
reform. Theoretically, the result is ambiguous, as the change in behavior, if such change 
occurred, may have resulted in higher effort to deliver growth but also regional policies 
with  negative  inter-regional  externalities.  We also  address  the  question  of  whether  the 
response  to  the  career  incentives  varied  among  regional  leaders  depending  on  their 
individual characteristics.  To preview, we find that the high-powered incentives did not 
result in faster growth on average and there is important variation in response to incentives 
among party secretaries;  only two groups of regional leaders -  leaders with new human 
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capital specific for the organizational reform and leaders with good connections to their 
neighbors - performed better in response to increased incentives. In addition, we investigate 
separately  what  were  the  outcomes  of  the  first  and  the  second  organizational  reforms 
conducted in 1957 and 1962.
Furthermore,  we  test  whether  political  connections  to  the  central  leadership 
influenced regional leaders’ careers. We expect political  connections to be an important 
determinant of career concerns during the whole period of Soviet history. 
The  “Sovnarkhoz”  reform  did  not  formally  affect  governance  of  agriculture, 
management  of which was always  organized as an M-form with administrative regions 
being its territorial divisions. Thus, we also test for yardstick competition in agriculture 
throughout the whole period under study. 
5. Data
We combine three sets of sources. We collect data on regional party secretaries’ turnovers, 
their profiles and regional economic performance. Archrival Politburo records organized by 
historians in a kind of data set (Denisov et al. 2004; Khlevnuk et al. 2009) contain data on 
regional  party  leaders’  appointments.  Politburo  records  also  provide  information  about 
reasons and future jobs of removed secretaries that help to classify their moves between 
positions and distinguish upward shifts, downward movements and stays at the same level. 
Goryachev (2005) and Khlevnuk et al. (2009) present biographies of regional leaders. We 
extract data on economic performance from 1956-1968 annual official statistical volumes 
for Russian federation (“Narodnoe khozyastvo RSFSR”).  The time span of our study is 
determined  by  data  availability.  The  intersection  of  three  sets  cover  the  time  period 
between 1953 and 1967 plus the year of 1950, i.e. 16 years all-together. The dataset unit is 
a party leader of a region in a year. The total number of region-year observations in the 
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sample is 1158. The total number of regions is 85, but only 72 regions per year on average 
due to a series of administrative-territorial reforms. The appendix provides details on our 
data management procedure. 
The use of declassified archival information has the advantage of no gaps in data on 
appointments. The only appointments of first party secretaries which we did not include 
into our analysis are appointments of those secretaries who worked less than a year in their 
offices. There were 5 such secretaries in 1950 and between 1953 and 1967, one of whom 
died in his office. Table 2 summarizes the changes in career status of regional leaders. 
There  were  72  cases  of  demotions,  55  cases  of  promotions  and  1031  region-year 
observations with regional first party secretaries either kept his/her office for another year 
or transferred to a similar position either in the central apparatus or in other regions. There 
was only one region, Tuva, where the only leader – Salchak Toka - ruled during the whole 
period under study. In eleven regions there were no cases of regional leaders’ upward or 
downward mobility:  all transfers in these regions were lateral.  In the remaining regions, 
there were on average three career transfers with an average tenure of slightly above four 
years. 
Table 2 somewhere here
Figure  1 plots  the  frequencies  of  both promotions  and demotions  over  time.  The 
termination  rate  is  more  volatile  than  the  promotion  rate.  In  1961  the  number  of 
terminations was three times larger than the average; nobody was demoted in 1964 and 
1966. The promotion level was between two and four during the most part of the period. 
Monthly levels of both termination and promotion vary between zero and three with two 
exceptions.  Waves  of  appointments  occurred  in  the  years  following  Stalin’s  death  and 
Khrushchev’s  victory  over  ‘anti-party’  group:  7  terminations  in  January  1954  and  5 
promotions in January 1958, accordingly.
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Figure 1 somewhere here
227 different persons occupied offices of regional party leaders in Soviet Russia in 
1950 and between 1953 and 1967.  Using  their  biographies,  we construct  a  number  of 
variables describing their personal characteristics – age and tenure in office - and important 
facts in their careers.4 We account for regional leaders’ experience of work together with 
the  country  leaders  before  they  occupied  important  position  in  the  Kremlin.5 We also 
register for their experience of work or study in Moscow, where officials could acquire 
important connections. Due to the same reasoning we construct a dummy for the graduates 
of the ‘High Party School’. Table 3 presents summary statistics of these variables.
Table 3 somewhere here.
Our choice of variables on regional economic performance was determined by data 
availability.  There are no data on regional GDP for the USSR or Soviet Russia. Regional 
industrial indexes are available, but there are no such aggregated variables for development 
of  agricultural.  We use a number  of disaggregated  variables  instead  – total  area under 
crops,  grain  and  meat  production.  Regional  level  data  are  missing  for  1950  for  the 
industrial  growth rate  variable  and there no information  on grain  and meat  production 
before 1957. Table 3 provides summary statistics on economic performance and table A1 
of  the  appendix  reports  correlation  matrix.  All  economic  performance  variables  vary 
substantially both across and within regions: thus, within and overall standard deviations of 
the area-under-crops variable are 461.2 and 1124.2, correspondingly.
According  to  official  records,  Soviet  industry  grew  at  almost  10% in  a  year  on 
average. Scholars agree that so high official rates of growth are the product of the Soviet 
methodology  of  aggregation  that  inflated  growth  rates.  Considering  that  Soviet 
4 We did not control for regional leaders’ gender once we have only one lady (Ekaterina 
Furtseva) in out database.
5 With Nikita Khrushchev for 1953 – 1964; and either with Leonid Brezhnev or Alexei 
Kosygin for 1965 – 1967. In 1950 nobody of regional leaders had experience of working 
with Stalin before he became the party leader in 1922.
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disaggregated series in natural units were correct and not falsified – the assumption that 
Soviet archives confirm (Harrison 2003) - Sovietologists invested huge efforts to produce 
from them a ‘true’ aggregated series of Soviet industrial development; they estimated that 
for the period 1953 - 1967 industrial growth was about 7.5 % (Bergson 1961, CIA 1990). 
There are no such estimates at the regional level. For our purposes, the upward bias of 
industrial rate figures is not a problem. The officials’ figures are the only numbers which 
the  central  government  knew.  We  investigate  whether  reported  figures  on  economic 
performance influenced the appointment decisions. 
6. Analysis 
6.1. The determinants of career concerns throughout the whole period under study
Our main  dependent  variable  here  is  the indicator  of  career  mobility  of  regional  party 
secretaries; in each region and each year, we code it as “-1” for demotion, “0” for staying at 
the same level (keeping the same position or a lateral transfer) and “1” for promotion. We 
use linear OLS regression model with fixed region and year  effects.  To be precise, we 
estimate the following equation:
∑ ++++++=
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where subscripts i and t index regions and years, respectively. E is a vector of independent 
variables which reflect economic performance of a region. We employ current economic 
performance variables because of ‘permanent monitoring’ principle formulated by Stalin as 
early  as  in  1934  (see  Stalin’s  speech  at  the  17th Party  Congress  –  Hoover/RGANI 
59/2/1/926),  according  to  which  the  center  had to  observe  efforts  and achievements  of 
subordinators permanently and to intervene immediately whenever necessary.  Moreover, 
6 Hoover/RGANI: “Archives of the Former Soviet State and Communist Party’ from the 
Russian State  Archives  of  Recent  History (Moscow) at  the  Hoover  Institution  of  War, 
Revolution,  and  Peace  (Stanford,  CA).  Russian  archival  documents  are  numbered 
according to a standard system: collection, inventory, file, folio.
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previous achievements could work in opposite direction in the Soviet economy due to the 
nature of the planning system which was based on the ratchet principle such that previous 
achievements are used as a benchmark for evaluation of future performance (Gregory and 
Stuart 1998). We employ agricultural variables in levels and industrial growth variable in 
rates  because  of  clearly  pronounced  trend  in  industrial  development.  P is  a  vector  of 
independent variables which are proxies for connections of a regional party secretary. 
X is a vector of controls that includes annual regional population controls taken in 
logs and personal characteristics of the regional leaders, namely age and tenure in office. 
To account for potential non-linear influence of age onto career, we also include age square 
variable into our analyses. There is no retirement age problem due to the absence of forced 
retirement rules in the USSR. We need year dummies, iϕ , to control for time shocks such 
as macroeconomic shocks or waves of appointments and regional dummies, tτ , to account 
for unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity. Given the size of Russia, we also introduce 
linear trends for mega regions - like North-West, Volga, Center, North Caucasus, Urals, 
West Siberia, East Siberia and Far East - to control for different development movements 
for  different  parts  of  the  country  which  the  central  government  most  likely  took  into 
account.  D is  a  set  of  dummies  for  linear  trends  for  such  mega  regions  and  gδ  are 
coefficients  on the mega-region-specific  linear  trends  gtD .  Finally,  ε is  an error term, 
assumed to be uncorrelated across regions, but not necessarily within regions (thus, we 
allow clusters at the level of regions).
Since our dependent variable is cardinal in nature, non linear models, such as ordered 
probit model, could potentially better fit data and give higher efficiency. Nonetheless, in 
our  baseline  specification,  we  employ  linear  regression  model  because  fixed  effects 
estimators  for  non-linear  models  can  be  severally  biased  due  to  incidental  parameters 
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problem when time span of the panel is small (Fernandez-Val 2009). We, however, verified 
that all our results go through if we use the ordered probit instead of OLS.
Table 4 presents the estimation results for different specifications. Due to gaps in the 
data, changes in specifications cause shifts in periods under study. In the first column we 
report  results  of  the  specification,  which  includes  only  one  variable  on  economic 
performance  -  area-under-crops  -  and  covers  the  largest  time  span,  namely  the  period 
between 1953 and 1967 and the year of 1950. An inclusion of the industrial growth rate 
variable (column 2) eases on 1950, and an inclusion of meat production variable limits the 
sample to the 1958-1967 period only.
Table 4 somewhere here.
Let us first consider the political  connections and agriculture,  which we expect to 
matter  throughout  the  whole  period.  Estimated  coefficients  support  our  hypothesis  on 
career  determinants  in  the  traditional  Soviet  hierarchy:  coefficients  on  variables  on 
agricultural  performance  and of  political  proxies  have  the  predicted  sign  and  they  are 
significant in all specifications at least at ten percent level, with only two exceptions. When 
the meat production variable is included into the model together with the area-under-crops 
variable,  coefficient on the former becomes insignificant (column 3 of table 4). That is 
because  these  two  agricultural  variables  are  highly  correlated  (0.755);  they  are  jointly 
significant at five percent level. The second exception is the effect of the ‘experience of 
work or study in Moscow’, which is a rather crude proxy for political connections and may 
be subject to severe measurement error, which would bias the coefficient towards zero (see 
column 2 of table 4).
The  coefficient on industrial growth rate variable is positive but insignificant in the 
second specification. It becomes significant when we add the meat production variable into 
the estimated model. An inclusion of the meat variable, however, also decreases the sample 
22
period.  In  the  last  column  of  the  table  we  report  regression  results  estimated  for  the 
specification  without  ‘meat’  but  under  short  time  span.  They  show  that  industrial 
performance matters only when we reduce the sample. In other words, during the whole 
period party regional leaders as heads of corresponding regional subunits cared only about 
agricultural performance and not industrial performance. 
Monitoring agricultural development, the central government evaluated first of all 
efforts  which officials  invested into agricultural  development.  In the specifications  with 
grain production variable (not reported) its estimated coefficients are insignificant. Soviet 
government paid attention to grain inputs – area-under-crops, while climate conditions and 
accordingly harvest  were out of their  control.  This finding is  consistent  with extensive 
character of Soviet agriculture, which heavily depended on weather.
Estimated  coefficients  on explanatory variables  demonstrate  that  politics  heavily 
affected  regional  party  leaders’  careers  in  the  Soviet  hierarchy.  Coefficients  in  the 
specification with only area-under-crops as an explanatory variables on regional economic 
performance suggest that a regional leader without connections with Soviet leaders had to 
increase  regional  area-under-crops  by  more  than  two  and  a  half  (2.58)  within  region 
standard deviation (461.2) in order to have similar career perspectives. An increase of area-
under-crops by a bit less than one within region standard deviation (0.92) compensated for 
lack of connections in Moscow. 
The regressions also suggest that career perspectives worsened with age for younger 
cohorts of regional leaders, while improved after the age of fifty one. The coefficients on 
the age variable have negative sign and of the age squared have positive sign. This result is 
weak; estimated coefficients are significant at ten percent level only in the specification 
with  area-under-crops  as  the  sole  variable  on  regional  economic  performance.  The 
population controls (not reported) and the tenure variable are insignificant. 
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6.2. Did the “Sovnarkhoz” reform create yardstick competition in industry? 
To test for the effect of  the “Sovnarkhoz” reform on regional leaders career concerns we 
add interaction  terms  between variables  measuring  economic  performance  and political 
connections, on the one hand, and the dummies for the ‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform period and two 
sub-periods before and after the 1962 modification, on the other hand. The reform time 
dummy is equal to one during the period 1958-1964. “Sovnarkhoz”  were established in 
1957  but  the  system  started  to  operate  in  full  degree  only  since  1958.  Brezhnev  re-
established the ministerial  system in September 1965, but the decision of “Sovnarkhoz’ 
dismantling was taken already at the end of 1964. We employ the end of the 1962 year as a 
border  between  sub-periods  because  the  actual  reorganization  occurred  in  November-
December of that year. Only the coefficient on the interaction with industrial growth rates 
variable  is  significant;  at  the  same  time  the  industrial  growth  rate  variable  itself  is 
insignificant. We report the results in table 5. 
Table 5 somewhere here.
The  results  support  our  hypothesis  that  industrial  performance  was  important  for 
career  advancements  of  regional  leaders  only  under  the  “Sovnarkhoz”  system.  The 
coefficient on the interaction of the industrial growth variable with the time period of the 
Sovnarkhozy  reform (column 1 of table 5) suggests that an increase of industrial growth 
rate  by  one  standard  deviation  (namely,  0.07,  once  we  consider  only  variation  within 
region) is roughly equal to the effect of an increase of the area-under-crops by one standard 
deviation (461.2, also calculated within-region). These effects are 5.9 and 7.4 percentage 
point  increases  in  probability  of  promotion,  respectively.  This  is  consistent  with 
interpretation of the “Sovnarkhoz” system as an M-form hierarchal structure which brought 
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a yard-stick competition for regional leaders into industry. Our findings also show that the 
introduction of the ‘Sovnarkhoz” system did not affect importance of political connections.
We report regression results estimated for the specification with the interaction of the 
industrial growth variable with the early years of the reform excluding late years of the 
reform in the second column and with separate interactions for the early and late years of 
the reform in the third column of table 5. The magnitude of estimated coefficients on the 
interactions for early years is larger than on the interaction with the whole ‘Sovnarkhoz” 
period. This is consistent with the nature of the 1962 reform that complicated the task to 
evaluate achievements across regions. The effect of yardstick competition created by the 
reform was stronger before the 1962 modification.
6.3. Did regional leaders respond to the change in incentives?
To test whether the change in incentives resulted in the change in performance, we rely on 
overtime variation of industrial growth rates. Namely, we regress regional industrial growth 
rates on the dummy for the time of the reform controlling for the other variables that were 
found to affect regional leaders’ career advancement. It is important to note that reliance 
purely on overtime variation permits alternative interpretation of the results, as they may 
have been other things going on at the same time. Thus, one has to exercise caution in 
interpreting these results. We consider both the whole period of the ‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform as 
well as sub-periods before and after the 1962 modification of ‘Sovnarkhoz’ system. Thus, 
we estimate the following specification 
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where  the  dependent  variable  z  stands  for  industrial  growth rate;  R is  the  dummy for 
“Sovnarkhoz”  period  (or  sub-periods);  A  is  an  independent  variables  which  reflect 
agricultural performance of a region (area-under-crops); η and κ are coefficients and other 
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variables are the same as in the equation (1). We report results in the first three columns of 
table 6. 
Table 6 somewhere here.
If we consider the whole period, the ‘Sovnarkhozy’  reform did not result in higher 
growth  in  industry.  The  estimated  coefficient  on  the  reform  variable  is  negative  and 
significant. However, these results are primary driven by two extremely bad years, namely 
1963 and 1964, when separate agricultural and industrial regional party units operated. An 
exclusion of these two years changes the sign of the time dummy (see column 2 of table 6). 
Moreover, the results reported in the third column of the table suggest that regions, where 
party units were divided, demonstrated significantly worse results than the regions, where 
separation reform did not happen. The regions, where ‘old’ secretaries became industrial 
secretaries, reduced their industrial growth rate on 1.4 percents in 1963-1964 relative to 
average  growth  in  other  years  (10.4  percents)  and  the  regions,  where  ‘old’  secretaries 
became  agricultural  secretaries,  reduced  their  industrial  growth  rate  even  more  on  3.3 
percents.  These  findings  are  consistent  with  writings  of  historians  who  agree  in 
interpretation of 1962 Khrushchev’s reorganization as a reform that produced an extremely 
negative shock (Hanson 2003). 
The  coefficient on ‘pure’  “Sovnarkhoz”  system time dummy hints that the system 
operated  better  before  the  1962 reform.  We find  that  this  is  strong for  two groups of 
regional  leaders who improved their  performance substantially in response to increased 
incentives:  leaders  appointed  during  “pure”  “Sovnarkhoz” period  and  leaders,  who 
graduated from the high party school. If we add dummy control for secretaries who were 
not appointed during the “pure”  “Sovnarkhoz” period and interaction of this dummy with 
“pure”  “Sovnarkhoz” period  time  dummy  into  our  regression  model,  the  estimated 
coefficient on ‘pure’ “Sovnarkhoz” period time dummy is positive and highly significant 
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(reported  in  the  4th  column  of  table  6).  Correspondingly,  if  we  include  party  school 
graduation dummy and its intersection into our regression model, the estimated coefficient 
on ‘pure’ “Sovnarkhoz” period time dummy is also positive and highly significant (column 
6). These results hold even if we exclude regions with separated party units which saw a 
negative shock in 1963-64 (columns 5 and 7). Lack of significant correlations between 
party school alumni and secretaries appointed under the ‘pure’  “Sovnarkhoz”  system (-
0.016) suggest that they represented two different groups of leaders who responded to the 
change in incentives.
Anecdotal  evidence  summarized  in  the  historical  section  implies  that  the 
“Sovnarkhoz” system  suffered  heavily  from the  negative  inter-regional  externalities,  a 
common  byproduct  of  M-forms.  Local  officials  had  narrow  interests  that  influenced 
harmfully onto development of other Soviet regions. We argue that regional leaders who 
graduated the party school acquired an important skill how to overcome this problem. They 
acquired  officials  from  other  regions  during  their  study  that  gave  them  a  chance  to 
coordinate inter-regional issues directly and not to damage development of their neighbors. 
The majority of regional leaders spent a couple of years at the party school roughly at the 
same  time,  namely,  in  the late  1940s – early  1950s.  This  was  a  byproduct  of  Stalin’s 
regional policy when the dictator used the party school as a tool against regional networks 
and corruption, regularly moving regional officials to Moscow for short terms (Denisov et 
al.  2003)  It  is  doubtless  that  regional  leaders  learned  an  advanced  management  their, 
because  ideological  issues  dominated  in  the  party  school’s  program (Khlevnuk  et.  al. 
2009).
Our  finding  that  recently  appointed  regional  leaders  worked  better  under 
“Sovnarkhoz” system points to the effect of positive transaction costs, associated with the 
need for new human capital,  as another source of expenses generated by organizational 
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reform. It might be difficult for the old generation to learn quickly new rules of the game. 
The new system required new people who were able to adapt for radical reforms better; this 
phenomena has been also observed in Russia during the transition period forty year later 
(Barberis  et  al.  1996).  Khrushchev’s  long  search  for  a  stable  system  and  continues 
management reforms strengthened this effect. Managers had few incentives to learn and 
follow new rules if the system was under permanent revision.
6.4. Sensitivity tests.
We conduct several sensitivity tests to make sure how robust our findings on career 
concerns  in  Soviet  political  hierarchy  are  to  alternative  specifications  and subsamples. 
First, we check how stable are our results relative to linear trends which we constructed for 
mega regions (like Volga, Urals etc.). We experiment either not accounting for such trends 
at all or allowing them to be non-linear. Second, we exclude observations of 1963 and 1964 
years for the regions where party units were divided into separate agricultural and industrial 
regional committees. Third, we repeat our exercises for the dataset without regions where 
only lateral transfers of regional leaders occurred. Table A2 and A3 of the appendix reports 
results of our main specifications. The chief variables of interest - area-under-crops and 
‘leader’  -  are  positive  and significant  at  least  at  ten percent  level  in  all  specifications. 
Coefficients on the interaction are positive and significant in three of four specifications. 
The ‘Moscow’ variable is positive, but significant in only half of specifications.
Further,  we  test  how  sensitive  our  results  are  to  the  appointments  occurred  in 
Januaries. One can argue that such changes in offices were determined by previous year 
economic performance not the current one; due to two waves of January appointments their 
number is substantial in our dataset. Table A4 of the appendix reports the results estimated 
on the dataset where January appointments are excluded. The main variables of interest - 
28
area-under-crops and ‘leader’ - are positive and significant at least at ten percent level in all 
specifications. Coefficients on the interaction are positive and significant. 
To  test  whether  the  significance  of  industrial  growth  rate  variable  is  driven  by 
‘Sovnarkhoz’  reform we used a number of interactions of industrial  rates with different 
time  dummy variables  shifting  time  spans  up  and  down relative  to  the  “Sovnarkhoz” 
reform. Table A5 of the appendix reports results of the specifications with such interaction 
terms. The coefficients on corresponding interaction terms are either insignificant or have 
higher corresponding p-values; their magnitude is also smaller in a half of cases.
Finally, we checked whether our results are sensitive to the functional form of the 
analyzed relationship between regional leaders’ career mobility and its determinants, using 
ordered probit and ordered logit models, as well probit and logit models for promotion and 
demotion separately. All results hold (not reported).
7. Conclusions
The main contribution of our analysis is to the empirical literature on the comparison 
of incentives of bureaucrats and outcomes in the U-form and M-form hierarchies. Previous 
economic literature – based primarily on cross-country comparisons – stresses the tradeoff 
between economies of scale (better realized in the U-form) and incentives (better realized 
in  M-form).  This  literature  agues  that,  in  the  absence  of  economies  of  scale,  M-form 
produces  better  outcomes.  In  contrast  to  this  literature,  we  study  the  change  of 
organizational  form  within  one  country,  namely,  introduction  and  reversal  of  the 
“Sovnarkhoz”  reform  in the USSR. We use detailed annual regional-level panel data on 
political  careers  of  regional  party  leaders,  their  background,  and  regional  economic 
indicators to show that the  “Sovnarkhoz”  reform reorganized the management of Soviet 
Industry  from  U-form  to  M-form.  This  reform  created  yardstick  competition between 
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regions  and  resulted  in  high-powered  incentives  for  regional  party  leaders  to  deliver 
industrial growth. 
Such a sharp change in incentives, however, did not translate into higher industrial 
performance on average. We find that only two groups of regional leaders responded with 
increased industrial  growth of their  regions to the reform: the leaders appointed during 
“Sovnarkhoz” period  and  the  leaders  with  good  connections  to  their  neighbors.  Our 
analysis highlights the following potential economic costs of switching from U-form to M-
form hierarchy. First, there may be a need for new human capital to accompany the change 
in the organizational structure for an increase in incentives to translate into better outcomes 
(as  leaders  who were  appointed  before  the  reform were  not  able  to  adjust  as  well  as 
newcomers).  Second,  yardstick  competition  under  M-form  may  result  in  severe  inter-
divisional externalities not internalized by the agents in charge of the competing divisions 
(as  regional  Sovnarkhoz  divisions  favored  autarky  in  preparation  of  their  plans  and 
allocation of resources). 
Our  analysis  also  confirms  the  result  of  the  previous  literature  that  personal 
connections  are  an  important  determinant  of  career  advancement  in  bureaucratic 
hierarchies:  during  the  whole  period  under  study,  regional  party  leaders’  careers  were 
substantially  more  successful  if  they  had  better  political  connection  to  the  central 
leadership. We also show that growth in agricultural inputs significantly affected career 
concerns  of  Russia’s  regional  leaders  throughout  the  whole  period  under  study;  as 
agriculture,  in  contrast  to  industry,  was  always  organized  as  an  M-form in  the  Soviet 
Union.
The  “Sovnarkhoz” reform  episode  of  the  Soviet  political  history  also  vividly 
demonstrates  political  challenges  of  a  transition  from  U-form  to  M-form  political 
hierarchy. Such reorganization undermines power of branch elites, who therefore, become 
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the  main  opposition  to  the  reform.  If,  however,  the  dictator  is  strong enough and can 
mobilize the winners from the reform, i.e.,  regional elites,  he may be able to crush the 
opposition. The history of the 1957 failed coup d'état against Khrushchev illustrates this 
point. The success of the subsequent 1964 successful coup against Khrushchev, lead by 
Brezhnev,  suggests  that  the support  of the regional  elite  is  crucial  for  sustainability  of 
reform. The political  support to Brezhnev’s plot came both from the central  production 
branch elite and regional leaders who opposed the reorganization of M-form conducted by 
Khrushchev in 1962. We argue that the 1962 reform was a disaster from the organizational 
standpoint  and show that  it  led  to  a  sharp  decline  in  industrial  as  well  as  agricultural 
growth.  Right  after  the 1964 coup,  Brezhnev reversed the reform and reintroduced the 
politically  stable  U-form  hierarchy.  The  story  of  the  fall  of  Khrushchev and  his 
“Sovnarkhoz” reform provides  an illustration  for  why inefficient—from the incentives’ 
point of view—U-form hierarchies such as the USSR persist for a long time. 
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Table 1. Political struggle and organizational reforms under Khrushchev and early Brezhnev
Date Struggle for power Organizational reforms
March 1953 Stalin’s death
September 1953 Khrushchev was elected the First 
Party Secretary 
Khrushchev: ‘local and regional party 
secretaries are responsible for 
agriculture’
January 1955 Malenkov was dismissed from the 
Prime Minister position, but 
remained a member of the Politburo 
of the CPSU
February 1956 XX party congress: Khrushchev did 
not get a majority in the Politburo
Khrushchev: ‘regional party secretaries 
have to supervise economy’
January - June 1957 Discussion and elaboration of the 
‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform
June 1957 ‘Anti-party’ group tried to dismiss 
Khrushchev
Second half of 1957 Realization of the ‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform
April 1958 Bulganin retired from the Prime 
Minister position. Khrushchev 
combined the leadership of the party 
and the state apparatus
Law prescribing the priority of inter-
regional contracts
May 1958 The Politburo blamed ‘non-authorized’ 
allocation of resources by regions
June 1960 - April 
1961
Introductions of inter-regional bodies
October 1961 XXII party congress: limitation of the 
number of terms in offices for party 
secretaries (never realized)
November 
-December 1962
1962 reorganization of ‘Sovnarkhoz’ 
system: introduction of production 
branch ‘state committees’ (ministries), 
centralization of construction, 
separation of regional party committees 
and enlargement of economic regions
October 1964 Brezhnev dismissed Khrushchev in a 
party coupe 
November 1964 Reunification of party regional 
committees (reversal of the separation 
reform of 1962)
September 1965 Full restoration of the ministerial 
system
Table 2. Changes in career status
1950, 1953-67 1953-67
frequency % frequency %
Demotions 72 6.22 66 6.05
Stay in office or lateral transfer 1031 89.03 971 89
Promotions 55 4.75 54 4.95
Total 1158 100 1091 100
Source: Calculated using Denisov et al. (2004) and Khlevnuk et al. (2009) 
Fig. 1. The time trend of Soviet regional leaders’ career mobility, 1950 - 1967
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Table 3. Regional economic performance and characteristics of regional leaders, 1950 and 
1953-1967
Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Indrate (%) 1035 9.8 4.1 -12 31
Crops (area under crops in th. Ha) 1132 1048 1124.2 0 6066
Grain (in th. Tons) 842 1065 1322 0 7470
Meat (in th. Tons) 842 64.5 51 1.3 341
Party school 1154 0.35 0.48 0 1
Moscow 1154 0.7 0.46 0 1
Leader 1154 0.11 0.31 0 1
Age 1154 49.6 5.1 33 66
Age2 1154 2483.6 510.6 1089 4356
Tenure 1155 4.4 4.03 1 35
Source:  Regional economic performance are calculated using Narodnoe khozyastvoe RSFSR v … Various 
issues, 1955-67; characteristics of regional leaders are from Denisov et al. (2004) and Khlevnuk et al. (2009) 
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Table  4. Determinants of regional leaders’ career mobility:  regression results (OLS with 
fixed effect)
1 2 3 4 5
Period 1950 & 1953-67 1953-67 1953 & 1958-67
Area-under-crops 0.00016 0.00019 0.00016 0.00017
[0.00007]** [0.00008]** [0.00007]** [0.00007]**
Indrate 0.49 0.87 0.85 0.88
[0.31] [0.35]** [0.34]** [0.35]**
Meat 0.0013 0.0016
[0.001] [0.0009]*
Leader 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.18
[0.06]*** [0.06]*** [0.07]** [0.08]** [0.07]**
Moscow 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09
[0.03]** [0.04] [0.05]* [0.05]* [0.05]*
Age -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06
[0.03]* [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05]
Age2 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
[0.0003]* [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0005]
Tenure -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004
[0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Urban and rural population controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trends for mega regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1121 1000 741 741 741
Number of regions 80 77 74 74 74
R2 within 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.1 0.1
Standard errors in brackets; 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
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Table  5.  Yardstick  competition  in  industry  under  the  ‘Sovnarkhoz’  system:  regression 
results (OLS with fixed effect). 
Period 1953-1967 1953-1962 & 
1965-1967
1953-1967
Crops 0.00019 0.0002 0.00019
[0.00008]** [0.00008]** [0.00008]**
Indrate 0.12 0.1 0.12
[0.4] [0.41] [0.4]
Indrate*‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform (1958 – 1964) 0.84
[0.47]*
Indrate*early years of ‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform 
(1958 – 1962)
0.97 0.93
[0.53]* [0.55]*
Indrate*late years of‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform 
(1963 – 1964)
0.54
[0.46]
Leader 0.19 0.21 0.19
[0.06]*** [0.07]*** [0.06]***
Moscow 0.07 0.07 0.07
[0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Urban and rural population controls Yes Yes Yes
Linear trends for mega regions Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1000 864 1000
Number of regions 77 77 77
R2 within 0.1 0.11 0.1
Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
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Table  6.  Changes  in  industrial  growth  rate  under  the  ‘Sovnarkhoz’  system:  regression 
results (OLS with fixed effect)
Period 1953-1967 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform (1958-
1964)
-0.005
[0.002]**
Early years of ‘Sovnarkhoz’ 
reform (1958-1962)
0.005 0.0006 0.016 0.009 0.013 0.009
[0.003]* [0.003] [0.004]*** [0.005]* [0.005]*** [0.005]*
‘1963-1964 agricultural 
party secretaries’
-0.032
[0.004]***
‘1963-1964 industrial party 
secretaries’
-0.014
[0.006]**
‘1963-1964 General party 
secretaries’
-0.005
[0.006]
Secretaries not appointed 
under early years of 
‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform
0.013 0.007
[0.004]*** [0.005]
Secretaries not appointed 
under early years of 
‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform * early 
years of ‘Sovnarkhoz’  
reform
-0.017 -0.011
[0.006]*** [0.006]*
Not party school graduates -0.004 -0.003
[0.006] [0.006]
Not party school graduates * 
early years of ‘Sovnarkhoz’  
reform
-0.013 -0.012
[0.006]** [0.006]**
Controls on agricultural 
performance and political 
connections
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Urban and Rural population 
controls (in logs)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personnel controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Are 1963-64 industrial and 
agricultural party secretaries 
included?
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 1000 1000 1000 1000 916 1000 916
Number of regions 77 77 77 77 77 77 77
R2 within 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.1 0.07 0.1 0.07
Standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
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Appendix.
We  combine  three  sources  of  information  to  construct  our  dataset:  (1)  list  of  regional 
leaders’  appointments  from archrival  Presidium/Politburo  records  (Denisov et  al.  2004; 
Khlevnuk  et  al.  2009;  also  available  at: 
http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/disciplines/politics/research/SovietProvinces/  a  
rchive/FirstSecretaries.htm);  (2) biographies  of  regional  leaders  from Goryachev (2005) 
and Khlevnuk et al. (2009); (3) data on regional economic performance from 1956-1968 
annual official statistical volumes for Russian federation (“Narodnoe khozyastvo RSFSR”). 
Our  dataset  includes  only  autonomous  republics,  oblast’s  and  kraies  of  Russian 
Federation, but not autonomous okrugs or autonomous oblsat’s given different decision-
making mechanisms on appointments of their leaders. The number of regions varied during 
the period under study as a result of series of administrative-territorial  reforms. Several 
new regions like Belgorod (1954), Lipetsk (1954), Kalmikia (1957) etc. were established; 
others like Velikii Luki (1957), Kamentsk (1956), Balashev (1956) were divided between 
their neighbors; finally borders of several regions (Rostov, Volgograd, Saratov in 1956 or 
Pskov and Tver’ in 1957) were changed. Regions from the later group enter as separate 
pre- and post-reform units into our dataset. 
The  only administrative  reform,  which we ignore  in  our  dataset,  is  Khrushchev’s 
1962 separation reform.  In 1963 – 1964 as a result  of this reform, 43 regions had two 
regional party units (obkoms) and two first party secretaries instead of one: an industrial 
first secretary and an agricultural one. Party secretaries of former united party organizations 
(‘old’  secretaries)  in  their  overwhelming  majority  became  either  agricultural  party 
secretaries or industrial party secretaries. ‘New’ people were promoted to other positions 
(‘new’ secretaries). However, there was no turnover at all in the latter group during the two 
years, when the separated party units existed. Because of this we count only ‘old’ party 
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secretaries, matching them in our database with economic performance of corresponding 
regions despite the fact that these party secretaries were responsible only for agriculture in 
30 cases and only for industry in 13 cases. Our results hold if we exclude 1963 and 1964 
observations.
We employ the following classifying procedure, coding regional leaders’ careers. We 
consider positions in the Politburo or the Politburo’s Secretariat as promotions for regional 
leaders as well  as posts of all-union ministers  and their  first-deputies,  heads of Central 
party  and  State  control  commissions,  heads  of  main  departments  in  the  Central  Party 
Committee’s apparatus and posts of first secretaries of union republics. Ambassadors in 
socialist countries, key officials in the central party apparatus are equal in our classification 
to the position of a regional first party secretary. Finally, we count transfers to positions of 
regional second party secretaries, heads of regional governments, plant directors, etc. as 
demotions. We code the single case of suicide as a demotion. We also code retirement as 
demotion due to the absence of forced retirement age in the USSR. (Full description of our 
codification is available from the authors by request.) 
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Table A1. Pair-wise correlation matrix.
Indrate Crops Meat Grain Party
school
Leader Moscow Age Age2 Tenure Change 
in 
career 
status
Indrate 1.0
Crops 0.1** 1.0
Meat0.05 0.75*** 1.0
Grain0.03 0.88*** 0.81*** 1.0
Partyschool0.02 -0.05* -0.03 -0.05 1.0
Leader -0.02 0.0 0.09** 0.03 -0.11*** 1.0
Moscow -0.05 -0.11*** -0.04 -0.08** 0.46*** -0.01 1.0
Age -0.07** 0.02 0.08** 0.04 -0.04 0.06** 0.01 1.0
Age2 -0.08** 0.02 0.08** 0.03 -0.04 0.05* 0.01 0.99*** 1.0
Tenure 0.01 -0.1*** -0.14***-0.11 -0.1*** -0.12*** -0.14*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 1.0
Change in 
career status
0.0 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09** -0.01 0.12*** 0.03 0.05* 0.06** -0.02 1.0
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
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Table A2. Robustness check on regional leaders’ career concerns: regression results (OLS 
with fixed effect).
1 2 3 4 5 6
Period 1950 & 
1953-67
1953-67 1950 & 
1953-67
1953-67
Area-under-crops 0.00017 0.00020 0.00020 0.00014 0.00016 0.00016
[0.00007]** [0.00009]** [0.00009]** [0.00006]** [0.00008]* [0.00008]**
indrate 0.48 0.1 0.32 -0.13
[0.33] [0.4] [0.31] [0.41]
Indrate*‘Sovnarkhoz’ 
reform (1958 – 1964) 0.89 1.02
[0.51]* [0.5]**
leader 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.16 0.17
[0.07]*** [0.07]*** [0.07]*** [0.06]*** [0.06]*** [0.06]***
Moscow 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06
[0.03]** [0.04]* [0.04]* [0.03]** [0.04] [0.04]
Age -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06
[0.03]* [0.04] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04]
Age2 0.00 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006
[0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004]
Tenure -0.0034 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Urban and rural 
population controls 
(in logs)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Are 1963-64 industrial 
and agricultural party 
secretaries included?
No No No Yes Yes Yes
Linear trends for 
mega regions
Yes Yes Yes No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional fixed 
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1035 916 916 1121 1000 1000
Number of regions 80 77 77 80 77 77
R2 within 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.08
Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
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Table A3. Robustness check on regional leaders’ career concerns: regression results (OLS 
with fixed effect).
1 2 3 4 5 6
Period 1950 & 1953-
67
1953-67 1950 & 
1953-67
1953-67
Area-under-crops 0.00017 0.00023 0.00023 0.00017 0.00020 0.00020
[0.00008]** [0.00009]** [0.00009]** [0.00008]** [0.00009]** [0.00009]**
indrate 0.4 0.14 0.56 0.14
[0.3] [0.37] [0.35] [0.47]
Indrate*‘Sovnarkhoz’ 
reform (1958 – 1964)
0.55 0.93
[0.52] [0.53]*
leader 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.2 0.2 0.2
[0.06]*** [0.07]*** [0.07]*** [0.06]*** [0.07]*** [0.07]***
Moscow 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.07
[0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.03]** [0.05] [0.05]
Age -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
[0.03]** [0.04] [0.04]* [0.03] [0.04] [0.04]
Age2 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
[0.0003]** [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004]
Tenure [0.005] -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
0.012 [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007]
Urban and rural 
population controls 
(in logs)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trends for 
mega regions
No No No Yes Yes Yes
Non-Linear trends 
for mega regions
Yes Yes Yes No No No
Are regions with 
only lateral transfers 
included ?
No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional fixed 
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1121 1000 1000 1000 887 887
Number of regions 80 77 77 69 66 66
R2 within 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.11
Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
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Table A4. Robustness check on regional leaders’ career concerns: regression results (OLS 
with fixed effect).
1 2 3
Period 1950 & 
1953-67
1953-67
Area-under-crops 0.00017 0.00020 0.00021
[0.00007]** [0.00008]*** [0.00007]***
indrate 0.43 0.06
[0.27] [0.37]
Indrate*‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform (1958 – 
1964)
0.81
[0.43]*
leader 0.12 0.12 0.12
[0.06]** [0.06]* [0.06]**
Moscow 0.06 0.07 0.07
[0.03]** [0.04]* [0.04]*
Age -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
[0.02] [0.03] [0.03]
Age2 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
[0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004]
Tenure -0.004 -0.005 -0.005
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Urban and rural population controls 
(in logs)
Yes Yes Yes
Are January appointments included? No No No
Linear trends for mega regions Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1085 967 967
Number of regions 80 77 77
R2 within 0.08 0.08 0.08
Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
47
Table A5 Robustness check on the ‘Sovnarkhoz’ reform (OLS with fixed effect).
1 2 3 4 5
Period 1953-1967
Crops 0.00019 0.00019 0.00019 0.00019 0.00018
[0.00008]** [0.00008]** [0.00008]** [0.00008]** [0.00008]**
Indrate 0.12 0.06 0.17 0.02 0.09
[0.4] [0.41] [0.38] [0.4] [0.41]
Leader 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
[0.06]*** [0.06]*** [0.06]*** [0.06]*** [0.06]***
Moscow 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06
[0.04] [0.04]* [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Indrate*‘Sovnarkhoz’ 
reform (1958 – 1964)
0.84
[0.47]*
Indrate * 1956-1962 dummy 0.87
[0.52]*
Indrate * 1957-63 dummy 0.74
[0.48]
Indrate * 1959-1965 dummy 1.08
[0.62]*
Indrate * 1960-1967 dummy 1.0
[0.7]
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Urban and rural population 
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear trends for mega 
regions
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Number of regions 77 0.10 77 77 0.10
R2 within 0.17 77 0.17 0.17 77
Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level
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